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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In re the Marriage of: ) 
JANICE RIRIE KUNZ and RICHARD ) Case No.: 20050374 
L. KUNZ (deceased) 
) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
REFERENCE TO PARTIES 
See inside cover of brief for identification of parties. In this brief the parties are 
generally identified by their first name or status as follows: 
Janice Kunz-"Divorcee" or "Janice". 
1953 - Civilly married to Richard [R. 7B,1f 1]. 
1961 - Richard and Janice are divorced. [R. 7B,^| 2] They never remarried. 
Notwithstanding the divorce, Janice claims to have continued to cohabit with Richard 
as a Plural Wife [R. 7B,H 4 & 9]. 
Rachael Kunz - "Deceased Wife" or "Rachael". 
1961 - Civil married to Richard, which marriage was terminated by her death 
in 1994 [R. 7B,1 3 & 5]. 
Lillie Spencer - "Plural Wife * or Lillie". 
1999 - Became Richard's plural wife, which continued until his death in 2003. 
[R. 7B,1 6 & 9]. 
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Lynne Kunz - "Widow" or"Lynne". 
1999 - Civil marriage to Richard, which continued until his death in 2003. 
[R. 7C,H 7]. 
Richard Kunz - "Deceased Husband" or "Richard". 
Addenda to Divorcee's brief are listed by letter of the alphabet. Addendum to Widow 
and Plural Wife's brief is listed by numbers. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In addition to the issues for review as stated in Janice's ("DIVORCEE'S") Brief, the 
following issues are presented for review: 
Issue #4: Whether the Court lacks jurisdiction. Whether the Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. Judge 
Peuler's 3/24/05 Order, which denied Widow and Plural Wife's motion for attorney fees 
because the motion was not timely filed, did not extend the time within which Divorcee could 
appeal from Judge Peuler's 11/16/04 "Final Order" [Add. B].1 
Judge Peuler's 11/16/04 Order was a "final order" [Add. B]. The 30 days time within 
which an appeal could be taken from that Order, as allowed by URAP 4(a),2 expired on 
12/16/04. Divorcee's Notice of Appeal was filed 4/20/05, which was more than four months 
1
 Copy of Judge Peuler's 11/16/04 Order is Add. B to Appellants' Brief herein. 
2
 See URAP 4(a), a copy of which is attached hereto as Add. 1 hereto. 
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after the time for appeal had expired. The appeal was a nullity, This Court lacks jurisdiction 
and the appeal should be dismissed. 
Standard of review: This issue involves a matter of law, to which a correction of 
error standard applies, according no particular deference to the lower court's conclusions. 
State v. Housekeeper, 62 P.3d 444 (Utah 2002); United Park City Mines v. Greater Park 
City Co., 870 P.2D 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Albretson v. Judd, 709 P.2d 347 (Utah 1985); 
Farley v. Sikes, 918 P.2d 895 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Bowers, 57 P.3d 1065 (Utah 
2002). 
Issue #5: Whether Divorcee's claims are barred by UC § 38-1-4.5. Whether 
Divorcee's claims are statutorily barred by the one year time limitation following termination 
of a relationship [UC § 38-1-4.5(2) - App. A], and by the requirement that both parties be 
capable of entering into a valid marriage [UC § 38-l-4.5(l)(a) &(b) - App. A]. Janice's 
claims are barred because she did not file her petition within one year after Richard's right 
to such a declaration was extinguished by his marriage to Lynne. 
Standard of review: This issue involves a matter of law, to which a correction of 
error standard applies, according no particular deference to the lower court's conclusions. 
See citations quoted in Issue #4 above. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed 
for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions.3 
3
 McKell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 100 P.3d 1159, \ 7 and cases there cited. 
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Issue #6: Whether Divorcee's claims are barred by a statute of repose. The time 
and circumstance limitations4 on Divorcee's right to obtain a judicial declaration that her 
relationship with Richard ripened into a common law marriage is a statute of repose, which 
bars her right to file a petition after Richard became disabled from such a declaration by his 
marriage to Lynne. Because it is a Statute of Repose, time limitations cannot be tolled. 
Standard of review: This issue involves a matter of law, to which a correction of 
error standard applies, according no particular deference to the lower court's conclusions. 
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed for correctness, affording no deference 
to the district court's legal conclusions.1" See citations quoted in Issue #4 above. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Widow and Plural Wife supplement the last ^ of sub-paragraph "'TT\ page 6 of 
Appellants' "Statement of the Case''6 by adding thereto the following two paragraphs: 
(1) Judge Peuler's 11/16/04 Order was a ufinal order" [Add, B].7 The 30 
day period within which an appeal from that final order could have been filed 
as required under URAP 4(a)8 expired on 12/16/04. No appeal from that order 
4
 See issue #5 above. 
' McKell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 100 P.3d 1159, ^  7 and cases there cited. 
6
 See page 6 in the ^ | immediately above heading fcfcC. Statement of Facts". 
7
 Copy of Judge Peuler's 11/16/04 Order is Add B to Appellants' Brief herein. 
8
 See URAP 4(a), a copy of which is attached hereto as Add. I hereto. 
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was filed within that 30 days Divorcee's Notice of Appeal was not filed until 
4/20/05, which was more than four months after the time for appeal had 
expired. Divorcee argues that her appeal was timely because it was filed 
within 30 days after the Court denied Appellees' motion for attorney fees, 
however, the denial was because that motion was untimely [Add. B]. That 
untimely motion for fees did not extend Divorcee's appeal time. 
(2) Motion for summary disposition. Widow and Plural Wife's Motions for 
Summary Disposition and for attorney fees were denied by a 6/01/05 Order 
which deferred ruling on said matters and the fee request "pending plenary 
presentation and consideration of the appeal" [App. 2]. Widow and Plural 
Wife still seek fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
2. Summary of relevant facts. A detailed summary of facts is not included herein 
because most of those matters are not relevant to the issues involved in this appeal. 
However, Widow and Plural Wife's 6/14/04 Reply includes a detailed summary of 
deceased husband's's three civil marriages, his divorce, the death of his second 
spouse, his plural wives, etc. [R 72-80], to which verified copies of underlying 
documents are attached thereto [R. 81-113]. 
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3. No response to immaterial facts. Widow and Plural Wife dispute many of 
Divorcee's alleged "Facts" and dispute the spin they have tried to put thereon.9 They 
have not responded to many alleged "facts"because they are not material to the issues 
involved in this appeal. 
4. Disputed material alleged "Facts." Widow and Plural Wife Dispute the following 
alleged "Facts" listed in Divorcee's brief, because they are untrue, conclusionary 
and/or because they have not been established by competent evidence, etc.: 
(a) % 7 & 9 - Alleged secret marriage to Lynne. Without reference to competent 
affidavits, Divorcee incorrectly argues that the Richard-Lynne Marriage was allegedly 
*
cdone in utter secrecy.'' Divorcee's citations to the record do not identify or establish 
any facts which support their secrecy claim. To the contrary, they were openly married 
by a Utah Judge.10 Divorcee's claim that said marriage was done "without her 
knowledge" is insufficient to establish or support her "secrecy" claim.11 
(b) H 9 - Alleged reason for Richard-Lynne marriage. Divorcee's claim that the 
Richard-Lynne marriage was a sham to allow Widow to remain in the U. S. on an 
For example no supporting facts have been presented by Divorcee's in 
support of her conclusion that Richard Kunz 9/17/99 marriage to Lynne Kunz 
was allegedly done in ^secret." 
10 
See marriage certificate, App. 3. 
See H 9, P. 7 in § C of their Statement of the Case" in Appellants' "Statement of Facts." 
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expiring visa is contrary to documentary evidence . In support of said claim they 
submit only inadmissible conclusionary statements wherein they argue that Richard 
& Lynne did not cohabit, etc. The conclusionary statements relied upon by Divorcee 
are from Debbie Kunz [R. 36-36, ^  10-14], Viroque Kunz [R. 46] and Divorcee [R. 
22, T| 6, 11 & 12], none of said affidavits affirmatively establish that any of them (1) 
had personal knowledge of the alleged "facts", (2) that any of them were competent 
to testify as to such matters, (3) that none of said affidavits state facts which would 
be admissible in evidence, etc. Those affidavits are inadmissible and insufficient to 
oppose the MSJ because they fail to meet the minimum affidavit requirements for 
affidavits as imposed by URCP 56(e).13 
(c) Deceased Husband's death certificate shows widow as his spouse. Richard's death 
certificate, [R. 112-113] shows Lynn as his widow. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
5. Divorcee's appeal should be dismissed because: 
(a) Untimely attorney fee request did not extend time for appeal. Widow and 
Plural wife's request for attorney fees was denied because the fee request was not 
timely filed. Accordingly, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider their motion for 
attorney fees. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Widow and Plural 
12
 See l^ 1-5, R 172-176. 
13
 See URCP 56(e) requirements in footnote 12 below. 
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Wife's motion for attorney fees, that motion did not extend the time for filing the 
appeal and as a result the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. 
(b) Statutory bar to Janice's petition. Time limits imposed by UC § 30-1-4.5 
[Add. "A" to App. brief] are an absolute statutory bar to Divorcee's petition seeking 
to have her relationship with Deceased Husband declared a common law marriage 
over 2 Vi years after Richard married Widow. See discussion in f^ 12 below. 
(c) UC § 30-1-4.5 is a statute of repose. As a statute of repose, UC § 30-1-
4.5 limits the time and circumstances within which Divorcee could have filed a 
petition asking that her relationship with Deceased Husband be declared a common 
law marriage. Because it is a statute of repose, and not a statute of limitations, the 
statutory time limits therein are not subject to being extended by tolling. Because a 
statute of repose is not subject to tolling, Mr. Morrison's argument that if he were 
allowed discovery he might be able to prove that the Lynne-Richard marriage was 
fraudulent, is without merit. Even if Mr. Morrison were able to prove fraud, (no fraud 
existed) this would not extend the absolute time limited by the statute of repose, 
(d) Morrison's insufficient URCP 56(f) affidavit. Even if the time limits imposed 
by UC § 30-1-4.5 could be tolled by fraud (no such tolling can occur), no evidence 
has been adduced which if proven would justify tolling. Morrison's URCP 56(f) 
Affidavit seeking discovery was grossly insufficient to meet the minimum 
requirements for such an affidavit. See discussion in \ 10 below. 
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(e) Attorney fees for frivolous appeal. Widow and Plural Wife should be awarded 
their attorney fees incurred in defending against this frivolous appeal See discussion 
in f^ 19 below. 
RESPONSE TO "ARGUMENT" 
I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER 
6. Insufficient URCP 56(f) affidavit. Although the facts may be unique, the applicable 
issues of law are well settled under Utah law. Utah Law was properly applied by the 
trial court to the undisputed facts. In his insufficient URCP 56(f) Affidavit, in an 
effort to avoid SJ [R 65-71].14 Morrison speculates that if Divorcee were afforded 
discovery she might be able to discovery some as yet unidentified disputed material 
issue of fact for trial The trial Court properly ruled15 that Morrison's URCP 56(f) 
affidavit did not sufficiently identify evidence to be sought through discovery which 
would be sufficient (if proven) to defeat Widow and Plural Wife's SJ.16 The Court 
14 
Citations to authorities and detailed discussions as to the reasons why 
Morrison's Affidavit fails to comply with minimum URCP 56(f) requirements 
are found in R. 55, ^ 14-15 and R. 139-140, ^  7-8. See detailed discussion re 
URCP 56(f) affidavits in Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 484 (Ut Ct. 
App 1990). 
15
 See Order datedl 1/16/04. [App. 3]. 
16 
Minimum standards for URCP 56(f) affidavit. At a minimum a URCP 
56(f) Affidavit must: (a) describe the type of additional discovery needed, (b) 
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specifically held that "with respect to the legal matters at issue, further discovery is 
unnecessary." [Add. "B" to Divorcee's Brief]. Because there are no disputed 
material facts, Summary judgment was properly granted. Alder v. Bayer Corp, AGFA 
Div., 63 P.3d 1068 (Utah 2002); WebBank v. American General Annuity Service 
Corp,, 54 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2002). 
7. Divorcee failed to meet her burden to effectively oppose MSJ. Divorcee failed to 
meet the burden of proof required to adequately oppose Appellees' MSJ. Instead she 
merely speculates that if she were allowed to conduct discovery that she might be able 
to find some disputed issue of fact for trial. The Utah Supreme Court recently ruled 
that as a minimum, to contest a properly supported MSJ,17 the opposing party was 
required: 
To successfully defend against a motion for summary judgment, 
the nonmoving party must set forth facts '"sufficient to establish 
the existence of an element essential to that party's case/" Failure 
to do so with regard to any of the essential elements of that party's 
claim will result in a conclusion that the moving party "is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." "In such a situation, there can be 'no 
genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of 
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 
the time required to complete that discovery, (c) specify the facts they believe 
the discovery would produce, (d) how it would defeat the pending MSJ. (e) 
reasons specified must be "adequate" and (f) they must show that the party is 
not merely on a "fishing expedition" for purely speculative facts. 
17 
Anderson Development Co. V. Tobias, 116 p. 3D 323 (Utah June 2005). Citing 
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah Ct.App.1994) 
(quoting Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). 
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necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56(c). (Emphasis added). 
Divorcee has failed to meet this burden of proof as to the issues discussed in f^ 7 above. 
No disputed material issues iliu'i c INCH il Ii uhlinl "Mini t I )i nta.v tus tailed lo iilnilify 
any material issue of fact, a trial would be a useless act. Widow and Plural wife 
respond to Divorcee's arguments re alleged errors by the trial court (as discussed in 
sub-paragraph "A") \Svr 1" f ^ | 'A" of Appellants' 8/22/05 brief] as follows: 
(P.12-20) 
Court properly applied the law to undisputed facts 
Conflicting evidence not weighed. Contrary to Divorcee's argument (P. 11-12), the SJ 
decision cJidll not result from,, weighing conflicting evidence. Even though the Commissioner 
expressed surprise at some of Divorcee's incredible claims, said matters were not nialen il 
to her decision. Instead, the MSJ was entirely based on undisputed facts and well settled 
Utah law, I'lir (,MimnisMun<,i\ tnai il< i i mm nu UukA llii" loll, .wing [ADD. C, P. 36, lines 
11-26: 
Looking at all of the facts, the petitioner was married and then 
subsequently divorced from the decedent, Mr. Kunz, and she wants 
that declared now to be a common law marriage, which on its 
face I have to invalidate the certified copy of the marriage 
between Lynn and Richard in 1999. To do that there has to be 
clear and convincing evidence that that was fraud. I don't have-that 
is a higher level. It is just under a criminal standard. I don't have that 
level. It doesn't rise to that level. (Emphasis added). 
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I can't see that I shouldn't grant the summary judgment because on 
its face the documents presented, the evidence presented is there is 
a valid marriage. There has been a valid marriage since 1999 in 
this case, and I don't have anything that stands in the way to 
show that it is not a valid marriage other than conclusionary 
statements, which is not the test under a 56(f) matter, and so the 
motion for summary judgment is granted. (Emphasis added). 
In her 11/16/04 Order Judge Peuler denied oral arguments based upon her review of 
a transcript of Commissioner Bradford's hearing. [Add, B]. 
10. Insufficient URCP 56(f) affidavit re discovery. Morrison filed an insufficient 
URCP 56(f) Affidavit [R. 65-71] in an attempt to delay the MSJ so as to allow 
discovery. As discussed above, the Court denied Divorcee's request and ruled that 
Morrison's affidavit was insufficient to comply with URCP 56(f) requirements. 
Curiously, Divorcee has not challeged the Court holding that Morrison's URCP 56(f) 
affidavit was in insufficient. Even now, Divorcee has not identified any disputed 
material issue of fact to be tried. Among other deficiencies, Morrison's affidavit 
generally discussed potential legal issues, but he failed to identify any specific 
material evidence expected to be obtained through discovery. [See footnotes #7, 8 
and 10, pages 5-8 above]. 
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B-(P .20-22) 
Divorcers Petition is barred as untimely 
1 Court held that Divorcee claims did not meet statutory requirements. As a 
condition firaxdem In i >i\oruv ol>l.iiimu» .tin onu-i \ aluLdiiiL1 hn relationship with 
Deceases Husband as a common law marriage under UC § 30-1 * /\ to 
App. brief] she must prove that she has met the statutory requirements. Judge 
Peuler's 11/16/04 ruliiiL ,i -?> M i "B" to App brief] held that Divorcee did not 
meet those statuioi \ iv* • nts:: 
The Court reaches this conclusion (affirming Commissioner 
Bradford's summary judgment of dismissal) based on the fact 
that even if the decedent Richard Kunz and petitioner Janice 
Kunz had a common law marriage, their alleged "union" 
was never legally defined as such prior to his 1999 marriage 
to Lynne R. Kunz. See, Utah Code Ai n I 30-1-4.5 
Additionally, after 1999, Mr, Kunz, did not have the ability 
to consent to a common law marriage with Janice Kunz 
because he was legally married to Lynn R. Kunz. (Emphasis 
added). 
Because Divorcee dici ring her petition during a period while Deceased Husband 
was capable of entering into a statutory coi i it i IOI i law i i lai i iage, 1:1: ic tin le ( vill i whicl i si ic was 
required to file petition is not subject to tolling and is absolutely barred as discussed below 
and in ^5 above. 
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12. Failure to meet jurisdictional requirements is an absolute bar. Before Divorcee 
could obtain a declaration of a valid common law marriage under UC § 30-1-4.5, she 
must prove that she and the Deceased Husband both met the statutory requirements. 
Judge Peuler's ruled [Add. "A" to App. brief- quoted in ^  8 above] that they did not 
meet the statutory requirements (a) in UC 30-l-4.5(l)(a) [capable of entering into a 
common law marriage, etc.] & (b) [after his marriage to Lynne, Richard was not 
capable of giving consent or entering into a solemnized marriage] and(b) that because 
their "union" was not declared to be a common law marriage within 1 year after his 
right to seek such a declaration was lost as a result of his marriage to Lynne, [as 
required by UC § 30-l-4.5(l)(a) & (b) and UC § 30-1-4.5(1)]. 
Failure to meet those statutory requirements is an absolute bar to granting Divorcee's 
petition to declare that a common law marriage resulted from her relationship with Deceased 
Husband.Unlike a statute of limitation, a statutory jurisdictional limitations period is not an 
affirmative defense subject to tolling, waiver or estoppel.18 In addition, a jurisdictional time 
limitation cannot be modified, and non-compliance with such a limitation is an absolute bar.19 
13. Statute of repose is an absolute bar. A statute of repose extinguishes a cause of 
action after a fixed period of time, regardless of when the cause of action accrued, 
Eschbaugh v Industrial Com w, 677 N. E. 2d 438 (5th Dist. 1996); 51 Am. Jur. 2d 
Limitation of Actions § 30 and authorities there cited. 
19
 Miller v New Jersey State Dept of Corrections, 145 F. 3d 616 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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potentially barring a plaintiffs suit before there has been an injury or before the cause 
'v action has arisen.20 UC § 30-1-4.5(2) [Add. "A" to App. brief) is a statute of 
icposc which ivad'i m n In..ml pail ,I , Imllows: 
The determination or establishment of a marriage under this 
section must occur during the relationship described in 
Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination 
of that relationship... (Emphasis added). 
I )w onxc ^ Jti'iiinnt! thai lln. I line period is subject to tolling under the discovery rule 
is without merit. As discussed above, a stati ite of feposc;: • c ai n lot be • tolled. 
14. Failure to adduce evidence of fraud Even if tl te tii t le wit! lin which Dn orcee could 
have filed a petition seeking a declaration that her relationship with Deceased 
Husband had ripened into a statutory common-law marriage were not barred (it is 
bai red foi til le reasons disci issed above), her Petition must be denied because she has 
failed to adduce any proof of 1 lei claii i i of a ft ai icii dei it c oi iceali i lei it of tl i = • i i m i riage 
between Deceased Husband and his Widow. See discussions in ][ 4, 6, 8 and 
quotation from Commissioner Bradford's decision where she discusses Divorcee's 
fai lure In \uU\\ ice clear - evidence of fraud in j^() above. 
20 
See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 31 and 32 and authorities there 
cited, including citation therein to Lee v. Gaufin, 367 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993) as 
authority. Utah cases which discuss an approve statutes of repose include the 
following: Jensen v. IHC, ^ 70-77, 82 P.3d 1076; Day v. Meek 976 P 2d 
1201, 1204-1206, (Utah 1999). 
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15. Divorcee's waiver. The trial court properly held that by her failure to ask the Court 
to declare her relationship with Deceased Husband to be a common law marriage 
during a period of 50 years, that she waived her right to do so [P. 26, lines 17-21 in 
Add. "C" to Appellant's brief]. 
16. Lillie has equal standing as a common-law wife. Both Lillie and Janice co-habited 
with Richard and but for his marriage to Lynne either might have qualified to be 
declared his common-law wife under UC § 30-1 -4.5. If there were to be a declaration 
of a common-law marriage, why shouldn't Lillie instead of Lynne be declared to be 
Richard's common-law wife? Morrison*s argument that the first plural wife should 
have priority over later plural wives in being declared to be the common-law wife 
makes little sense. During oral argument Morrison admitted that if Richard's 
marriage to Lynne was valid, that Janice had no claim: [Add. "C", page 33, lines 1-
6]. 
THE COURT: If it's [1999 marriage between Richard and 
Lynne] determined to be a valid marriage where does that put 
your client? 
MR. MORRISON: If their marriage is valid then I think we're 
done. 
THE COURT: I think so, too 
MR. MORRISON: Yeah. 
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However, since there was a valid 1999 marriage between Lynne and Richard, after 
that time Richard had no capacity to have his relationship with either Lille or Lynne 
declared to be a common law marriage. 
II 
DIVORCE ENDED DHVORCEE'S MARRIAGE TO DECEASED 
HUSBAND 
17. Summary disposition efforts. Contrary to Divorcee's argument [I\ 22231 V <i -
and Plural Wife attempts to obtain summary disposition in this matter were and 
continue to be good faith attempts to demonstrate that this Court lacks jurisdiction, 
111,11 I)i v * >\x tx' s 11;inns are wb - rit etc. 
18. I IT"! in n i111 II!In,l I "N \ in'TfT \ mar r i age to Deceased H u s b a n d . Divorcee makes the 
curious argument that because she continued to live with deceased 1 n isbai id after tl ie> 7 
were divorced, the Court should overlook his later marriages to two women, should 
ignore his polygamous relationships with other women, should ignore the statutory 
time and fact lin litations • n i tl ic Coi n t s ability t< > declare a statutory common-law 
marr iag, for some unexplained reason, and in some undefined manner, Divorcee now 
asks the Court to declare that she should be judicially recognized as deceased 
Hi i >1 )and's widow [App. brief P 23-24; 26-27] As Commissioner Bradford 
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observed, Divorcee, is, in effect, asking the Court to give judicial approval to her 
misconduct: 
THE COURT: Okay. So in essence, it feels like Pm either 
tacitly approving polygamist relationship by allow these 
common law marriages, divorce, marriages, divorces to 
accumulates so that we don't have to count any of the marriages, 
we just go back to the first one. We allow that perpetration of 
a fraud on the courts and society in favor of the first 
polygamist wife, disregarding all of the fraud that had been 
committed since that time, and the tacit approval of the first 
wife, correct? (Emphasis added). 
Divorcee's ongoing attempt to obtain judicial approval of her misconduct should not 
be tolerated. The Court should affirm the summary judgment dismissing her petition. 
19. Unsupported accusations should be disregarded. Without supporting evidence, 
Divorcee's counsel wildly speculates as to the reasons Deceased Husband and Widow 
married, and he then asks the court to deny based on his suspicions their marriage 
might be subject to challenge [P. 24-26]. His speculation is so lacking in merit that 
it does not require a response, other than to deny his claims. 
20. Request for attorney fees re appeal. Widow and Plural Wife should be awarded 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending against Divorcee's frivolous appeal.21 
Among other things, attorney fees should be awarded because the appeal was not 
See^l 1 of App. 3. 
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brought or asserted in good faith and because it is without merit. Utah case law also 
approves the award of attorney fees where, as here, the appeal lacks merit.23 The 
22 
RULE 33. DAMAGES FOR DELAY OR FRIVOLOUS APPEAL; 
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
(a) Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal. Except in a first appeal of right 
in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken 
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, 
which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the 
damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. (Underlining emphasis 
added). 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, 
cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit 
only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. (Underlining 
emphasis added). 
23 
See the 2003 decision in ECO Marketing, hu V. Hardesty, (Unpublished 
Opinion found at 2003 WL 21290892), where under circumstances where the 
appeal lacked merit the Utah Court of Appeals awarded attorney fees to the 
respondent where, as here, the applicable law was clear. The Court reasoned 
as follows, which reasoning is equally applicable in the present case: 
In the case before us, an accord and satisfaction was reached as 
a matter of law. The law in regard to what constitutes an accord 
and satisfaction, in this context, has been clear for many 
years. See Estate Landscape. 844 P.2d at 330 ("Where, as here, 
the check is tendered under the condition that negotiation will 
constitute full settlement, mere negotiation of the check 
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amount awarded as attorney fees should be fixed based upon affidavits filed after the 
Court rules on this motion, so that all fees incurred can be included in the award. 
Ill 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal should be dismissed because it was filed after the time for an appeal had 
expired. This Court should affirm the dismissal by the trial court because when Deceased 
Husband married Widow, he disabled himself from entering into any common law marriage. 
Attorney fees incurred in connection with this appeal should be awarded to Widow and 
Plural Wife under URAP 33. 
constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's efforts or intent 
to negate the condition."); Marton Remodeling v. Jensen. 706 
P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1985) (holding that the negotiation of a 
check with a restrictive condition is an accord and satisfaction 
under the general rule even though the creditor wrote "not full 
payment" on the check before negotiation); Dishinger. 2001 UT 
App 209 at ^ 26 (quoting Estate Landscape for the proposition 
that " fmere negotiation of the check constitutes the accord, 
regardless of the payee's efforts or intent to negate the condition1 
" (citation omitted)); Cave View Excavating & Constr. Co. v. 
Flvnn. 758 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (crossing out a 
restrictive condition before negotiating a check does not avoid 
an accord and satisfaction); see also Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-
311 (2001). ECO's appeal is "not warranted by existing law" 
and ECO does not present"a good faith argument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33(b). 
Accordingly, we award Hardesty the requested attorney fees 
and costs incurred on appeal. (Emphasis added). 
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Dated October /<T , 2005. 
BARKER LAW OFFICE, LLC 
By: 
Ronald C. Barker 
I¥ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief to be mailed 
by first class mail October /<f , 2005 to the following persons: 
William P. Morrison, Esq. 
Grant W. P. Morrison, Esq. 
MORRISON & MORRISON 
352 East 900 South 
S.ill I iikc(Mt>, I'tali XII I I 
BARKER LAW OFFICE, LLC 
(1. By 
Ronald C. Barker 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Rule 4 - Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure. 
Appendix 2: Court of Appeals Junel, 2005 - URAP 10(f) Order denying Motions 
for Summary Disposition & reserving issues for plenary presentation 
and consideration in connection with the appeal. 
Appendix 3: R.94 - 95 - Marriage license re 9/17/99 marriage between Richard 
Lyman Kunz & Lynne Rosetta Miller. 
APPENDIX 1 
Rule 3 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Note 69 
payment the following day. Van Wagoner v Bar-
ben, 1894, 9 Utah 481, 36 P. 497 Appeal And 
Error <®=* 370 
R U L E 4, APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN 
(a) Appeal from final judgment ajid order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice 
of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However, 
when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful 
detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk 
of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under 
Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, 
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is 
granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 
for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the 
order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. Similarly, 
if a timely motion is filed in the trial court (1) for a new trial under Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,; or (2) to withdraw1 a plea under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-6, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order 
denying 'a new trial or granting or denying the motion to withdraw the plea. A 
notice of appeal filed before £he disposition of any of the above motions shall have no 
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured 
from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided 
$bove. 
' (c) Filing prior to entry of Judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph ,(b) of this n$$, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of the 
trial court fehall be treated as filed after such enfry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, 
^HyUQth r^ party may JBle a notice of appeal within 14 days after the* date on which 
the* first inotice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by 
paragraph (a) of this rute, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable 
negleqti or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion 
filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph 
(a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the* prescribed time may be ex 
parte unles^tfye {rial court otherwise require^ Notice ,pf a motion filecl after 
expiration of $je prescribed tone shall be given tp the^ other parties in accordance 
with the rules'of practice of the trial court No extension^ shall exceed 30 days past 
the prescribed*'ti$ie or 10 flays from the date pf entyy of tjie, order grantfrg the 
motion, whichever occurs lateu.< 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OoOoo 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 1 - 2005 
In re the Marriage of: 
Janice Ririe Kunz and 
Richard L. Kunz 
(deceased). 
ORDER 
Case No. 20050374-CA 
RECEIVED 
JUN 03 200*1 
This matter is before the court on Appellees' first and 
second motions for summary disposition and request for attorney 
fees under rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellees' motions for summary 
disposition are denied, and a ruling on the issues raised therein 
is deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration of the 
appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 10(f). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties' requests for an 
award of costs and attorney fees under rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure are denied, without prejudice. This 
appeal shall proceed to the next procedural stage. 
Dated this / « . day of June, 2005. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Norman H. J a r a s o n , Judge 
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USE BLACK INK 
TO THE MARRIAGE OFFICIANT: Please complete and sign the bottom of the application and return both the application and official 
Marriage License to the Salt Lake County Clerk's Office, using the self-addressed envelope furnished for this purpose. Both the 
application & license must be returned ^ f t j f l th[rty (30) days. Failure to return this information within 30 days is a misdemeanor offense. 
State of Utah 
County of Salt f ake 
I, the undetsiqned Salt Lake Couniv1 
Clerk do herebv certify that in 
annexed and *oragomg is a true anc 
full copy of an original document on 
file m my office. 
Witness my hand and seal of sa(d 
itficp this 
